Showing posts with label finance. Show all posts

Showing posts with label finance. Show all posts

State of Macro

Defence is the Last Thing the Dismal Science Needs Right Now

After publishing a parade of articles branding economics as useless for most practical purposes, the Economist finally got a rebuttal out of Robert Lucas. I think he took the hint that the complaint was mainly aimed at Chicago macro rather than macro proper (although the difference between the two can be more or less clear-cut, depending on where you are taught). Lucas said:

One thing we are not going to have, now or ever, is a set of models that forecasts sudden falls in the value of financial assets, like the declines that followed the failure of Lehman Brothers in September. This is nothing new. It has been known for more than 40 years and is one of the main implications of Eugene Fama’s “efficient-market hypothesis” (EMH), which states that the price of a financial asset reflects all relevant, generally available information. If an economist had a formula that could reliably forecast crises a week in advance, say, then that formula would become part of generally available information and prices would fall a week earlier...

The main lesson we should take away from the EMH for policymaking purposes is the futility of trying to deal with crises and recessions by finding central bankers and regulators who can identify and puncture bubbles. If these people exist, we will not be able to afford them.

Now that conclusion sounds pretty dark, even for a dark age. I still struggle to understand the argument though. Prof Lucas's contention is that if there exists a tool that can correctly forecast recession/crisis, then there cannot be a crisis in the first place (the price would have fallen earlier). Hence, proof by contradiction...the fact that Lehman does happen and will happen again, must imply that such a tool cannot exist, ever.

There lies the Achilles heal of the argument. Must Lehman happen again? If there was a tool predicting its calamity, its price would have dropped before Sep 2008. Foreseeing this, Lehman probably would have avoided buying toxic securities. The originators seeing no profit, would have been more careful making subprime loans. And the crisis would never happen. The EMH, conditional on the economists delivering a good set of tool in detecting the eventual crisis, would imply no crisis. And that's what we want!

Whilst private businesses are very good at making money for themselves, they are not too preoccupied with the bigger picture of how their interactions could lead to systemic demise for everyone. After all, that is the job of the economists! To concede that if the market doesn't see it, it is hopeless for economists to work on it, is irresponsible and would indeed push the profession deeper into the dark territory.

MABE 2009: Revision Questions

In this post, I will answer questions that some of you sent me while revising for exams.

1. As, Price stability suggests that inflation should be "low and stable", should we set inflation close to zero as possible? Is the result of setting inflation close zero mean that we will be at risk of deflation? And what is the appropriate rate of inflation (inflation Targeting) or it depend on each in country forecast as New Keynesian suggested?

This is a good question, and one that I didn't get to address properly in lectures. If price stability is so important, why don't we aim for zero inflation? After all, our ultimate aim is price stability rather than inflation stability. There are at least 2 reasons why, in practice, targeting a low but positive inflation may be a good idea.

First, as you stated, there is a danger of deflation, which can make monetary policy ineffective and thus can be very costly (Japan's lost decade is the prime example here). So, even if zero inflation may be desirable in principles, the upside and downside costs of missing your target is highly asymmetric: you are much happier to end up with 1% inflation, rather than -1%. Just to be on the safe side, targeting a small but positive inflation reduces the deflation risk.

Secondly, it is well-known that our measurement of inflation is imperfect, especially because we cannot account for the quality improvement of goods. For example, the cars' prices may rise every year, but does that mean we have a higher inflation, or simply that cars this year are better than last year model? Due to this unseen quality adjustment, economists are aware that our measured inflation is probably subject to upward bias: it tends to overstates the true inflation. Hence, while we may aim for close to zero inflation, in practice we target a slightly positive number.

What inflation number precisely? I think most central banks would agree that somewhere around 1-2% represents price stability. Countries with higher targets may be those whose inflation targets are still 'converging' towards their long-run ultimate objective.

MABE 2009: Lectures 7,8,9,10 and Exams Prep

Long-overdue presentations for the rest of the course have been uploaded.
If you have any questions/problems during your revision, please let me know!

MABE 2009: Lectures 5 and 6 Materials

Presentation files and readings are available for downloads

MABE 2009: Lectures 3 and 4 Materials

Lecture materials for download...


You may also find the following extra readings useful

MABE 2009: Lectures 1 and 2 Materials

Lecture materials can be downloaded here...
I've told the class what the password was, but if you forget what it is, please send me an email.

I've included the excel files and other reference materials in the lecture pack as well, in case you find them useful.

Mohammed El-Erian on Global Economy

The legendary El-Erian speaks at Charlie Rose's programme. I'm buying his book at first opportunity!

Part 1


Part 2


Part 3

MABE: Simulation Game Data, and Other Comments

First of all, I hope you are already aware that tomorrow class (Sat 5th) is postponed to Sunday 13th! Check out the updated schedule here.

Next, regarding the simulation game, links to various data sources can be found at the following:
For those writing Fed reports, you may want to go straight to the following
Those writing ECB reports, please see

Do let me know if there is any other data series which you want, but cannot obtain from the web. I'll try to get them for you if possible.


MABE: Extra Readings for Lecture 4

Here are some extra readings for lecture 4 which you may find helpful.

For a comprehensive coverage of instruments in the money market (eurodollars, fed fund futures, swaps etc) please check out
On how to infer market expectations from the prices of these markets, please see the following introductory article
Do check out the references therein, which include a more detailed paper and a speech by Ben Bernanke on the topic.

I have gathered some of these papers plus additional ones that may be of interests, and you can download them HERE. Most of these go well beyond the scope of this course, so you only need to read these selectively!

MABE: Lecture 6 Note

Here's the final note for my final lecture
Dr. Surach will take over from Saturday July 6th onwards. Drop me any questions in the meantime, either via email or on the chat box to the right. And check this website periodically, as I may post some materials.

MABE: Lecture 5 Note & Some Fixed Income Readings

Here's note for

Some readings on forward rates computation, and duration/convexity etc as requested

Quote of the Week

Questioned whether the EU leaders discussed foreign exchange intervention, Jean-Claude Juncker said
"Would we have done so, I wouldn't answer the question, but we have not done so. Would we have done so, I would have denied that we did"

MABE: Lecture 3 and 4 Notes

Here're notes for
A couple of excel files shown in class are included in the pack.

MABE Simulation Game: Primer on Economic Data

In your assignments, the reports (both economic and financial) will need to discuss the implications of real-life incoming economic data. To understand what these are, and what they mean, a good place to start would be the following 'primers'

For basic explanation on economic indicators, e.g. what does 'annualised' mean etc, please see

More materials to be posted here. Do check back.

MABE: Lecture 2 Fixed Income Securities

Here's lecture ppt file.

MABE: Money and Financial Management in Economic Development

That's mouthful for a course title.

Here's Lecture-1 note and course descriptions .

Details about the assignments tba, but probably will be similar to last year as I mentioned.

George Soros on Credit Crisis


George Soros delivered a lecture at the LSE on May 21st, 2008 on his 'reflexivity', credit crisis and others (actually to advertise his book, but still a very interesting talk).


http://www.georgesoros.com/lse-creditcrisis08-podcast

Bernanke's Top Gun on Bubbles

Full story @ WSJ

Now, the study of financial bubbles is hot.

Its hub is Princeton, 40 miles south of Wall Street, home to a band of young scholars hired by former professor Ben Bernanke, now the nation's chief bubble watcher as Federal Reserve chairman. The group includes Mr. Hong, a Vietnam native raised in Silicon Valley; a Chinese wunderkind who started as a physicist; and a German who'd been groomed to take over the family carpentry business. Among their conclusions:

Bubbles emerge at times when investors profoundly disagree about the significance of a big economic development, such as the birth of the Internet. Because it's so much harder to bet on prices going down than up, the bullish investors dominate.

Once they get going, financial bubbles are marked by huge increases in trading, making them easier to identify.

Manias can persist even though many smart people suspect a bubble, because no one of them has the firepower to successfully attack it. Only when skeptical investors act simultaneously -- a moment impossible to predict -- does the bubble pop.

As a result of all that and more, the Princeton squad argues that the Fed can and should try to restrain bubbles, rather than following former Chairman Alan Greenspan's approach: watchful waiting while prices rise and then cleaning up the mess after a bubble bursts.