Showing posts with label economy. Show all posts

Showing posts with label economy. Show all posts

3 Letters from Economists

Fiscal sustainability is no doubt the next looming concern, not least for those advanced economies that have stretched their budgets in dealing with the 2007 financial crisis.

On the Valentines day, Besley, Goodhart, Pissarides, Vickers, Muellbauer, Rogoff , Sargent and others, cosigned a letter stating:

In order to minimise this risk and support a sustainable recovery, the next [British] government should set out a detailed plan to reduce the structural budget deficit more quickly than set out in the 2009 pre-budget report.

The exact timing of measures should be sensitive to developments in the economy, particularly the fragility of the recovery. However, in order to be credible, the government’s goal should be to eliminate the structural current budget deficit over the course of a parliament, and there is a compelling case, all else being equal, for the first measures beginning to take effect in the 2010-11 fiscal year.


Then on Feb 18th, followed 2 more letters.

Layard, Allsopp, Blinder, Hendry, Solow and Vines argued:

We disagree.

First, while unemployment is still high, it would be dangerous to reduce the government’s contribution to aggregate demand beyond the cuts already planned for 2010-11 (which amount to 1 per cent of gross domestic product). History is littered with examples of premature withdrawal of the government stimulus, from the US in 1937 to Japan in 1997. With people’s livelihoods at stake, a responsible government should avoid reckless actions.

Second, Britain’s level of government debt is not out of control. The net debt relative to GDP is lower than the Group of Seven average, and on present government plans it will peak at 78 per cent of annual GDP in 2014-15, and then fall. Moreover British debt has a longer maturity than most other countries, and current interest rates on government debt at 4 per cent are also low by recent standards.

Third, since the crisis began, private households and businesses have had to increase their saving in order to reduce their debts. It is this saving that finances the government deficit. If the government did not take up the slack, there would be a deeper recession.

Of course there needs to be a clear plan for reducing the government deficit. But the existing one for next year appears sensible. What is needed then is much more detail for the following years, and a radical plan for the medium term. That is what the debate should be about.


The last letter signed by Skidelsky, Marcus Miller, Blanchflower, De Grauwe, DeLong, Freeman, Hammond, Kirman, Manning, Richard Smith, Stiglitz and others also disagreed with Tim Besley and co.:

We believe they are wrong.

What they fail to point out is that the current deficit reflects the deepest and longest global recession since the war, with extraordinary public sector fiscal and financial support needed to prevent the UK economy falling off a cliff.

There is no disagreement that fiscal consolidation will be necessary to put UK public finances back on a sustainable basis. But the timing of the measures should depend on the strength of the recovery. The Treasury has committed itself to more than halving the budget deficit by 2013-14, with most of the consolidation taking place when recovery is firmly established. In urging a faster pace of deficit reduction to reassure the financial markets, the signatories of the Sunday Times letter implicitly accept as binding the views of the same financial markets whose mistakes precipitated the crisis in the first place!

They seek to frighten us with the present level of the deficit but mention neither the automatic reduction that will be achieved as and when growth is resumed nor the effects of growth on investor confidence. How do the letter’s signatories imagine foreign creditors will react if implementing fierce spending cuts tips the economy back into recession? To ask – as they do – for independent appraisal of fiscal policy forecasts is sensible. But for the good of the British people – and for fiscal sustainability – the first priority must be to restore robust economic growth. The wealth of the nation lies in what its citizens can produce.



Lord Keynes certainly won't be disappointed by sons of the land.

Myths vs Reality

FT has just posted this piece, 'Ten myths of Indian economy' by Shankar Acharya, a very prominent economist in India. Quite a lot of these apply equally well to Thailand. Reasonable thoughts on economics is surprisingly something of a rarity in policy circle...we should have more people like him over here.

Economic policy in India, and perhaps in other countries, is constrained by powerful prevailing myths and prejudices. Sometimes these myths simply reflect lazy thinking or an apparent immunity to facts. Sometimes they are shored up by strong vested interests. Sometimes all three. Whatever the reason it is hard to dispute the potency of myths in economic policy making. Here are my 10 favourites, some old, some new.
1. Higher minimum support prices for food grains are good for farmers. Not so. Yes, they are good for a powerful minority of farmers who have sizable marketable surpluses and ready access to government procurement programmes. But the majority of Indian farmers (especially poorer marginal farmers) are hurt by higher food prices for the simple reason that they are net buyers of food grains. And when you add in tens of millions of landless labour, it is quite clear that inexorably higher MSPs for wheat and rice are often quite damaging for rural households.

2. The move to a Goods and Services Tax will reduce the burden of taxation. I hope not! Or the already enormous fiscal deficit will soar higher. The more thoughtful government pronouncements do speak of a reform which is revenue-neutral or even revenue-enhancing. But there are many who tout the illusory prospect of a lower tax burden. The underlying logic of this reform is not tax relief but rather relief from distorted economic incentives and avoidable hassles and uncertainties, which are embedded in the current system of multiple indirect taxes.

3. There is no role for monetary policy when inflation is driven by supply shortfalls. Not quite. The truth is that the extent and duration of an inflationary bout triggered by a supply shock (such as a drought) does depend on the degree of accommodation offered by monetary policy. If liquidity is excessive, the inflationary consequences will be greater; if liquidity is tighter, price increases will be less. Of course, the act of tightening monetary policy can reduce output expansion. Hence the short term trade-off between inflation and growth is a live issue even when the initial shock is from the supply side. And then there is the problem of expectations: if monetary policy stands pat in the face of supply-induced inflation, then inflationary expectations can fuel the fire.

4. Our labour laws protect labour. Quite the opposite. Present laws over-protect a tiny minority (about 5 per cent of India’s 450m plus labour force, not counting government employees) at the expense of the vast majority of workers. By making it extremely difficult to retrench workers in the organised sector our existing laws massively discourage the employment of new workers in organized enterprises. In effect, these laws are very anti-employment and lead to huge under utilisation and “casualisation”of our most abundant resource, low-skill labour.

5. The exchange rate only matters to exporters. This is a common misperception, even among trained economists. Actually, the exchange rate is the single most important price in the economy, which powerfully influences the relative profitability of all tradable goods and services versus non-tradables (like haircuts in Delhi or restaurant meals in Mumbai). Thus, an appreciation of the rupee (versus foreign currencies) not only makes exports less profitable but also hurts an even greater range of import substitutes, that is goods and services produced for our home market in competition with imports from abroad.

6. Reducing fiscal deficits hurts growth. In the present “fiscally stimulated” environment there is much anxiety that a reduction in the current record high fiscal deficits (over 10 per cent of gross domestic product) will hurt growth. The massive deficits of 2008/9 and 2009/10 were perhaps justifiable in the face of contractionary effects of the global crisis. But these deficits are neither sustainable nor desirable. Actually, the Indian economy has grown fastest during periods when deficits were being reduced (1992-1997 and 2003-2008) and slower when deficits were expanding (1997-2002). This is because less government borrowing usually facilitates more productive private investment.

7. Subsidies on food, fuel and electricity help mainly the poor. Not so. The food subsidy mainly helps better off farmers and consumers in only four or five states where the public distribution system has effective coverage. The great majority of India’s poor do not have effective access to subsidized food grains. Many studies have shown that the huge subsidies on petrol, diesel, LPG cylinders and kerosene mainly accrue to better-off urban households (all those fuel-guzzling cars and SUVs). The large state government subsidies on electricity for agriculture have helped to thoroughly undermine the development of a viable electricity distribution network and kept our villages in darkness. In contrast, note how the rapid spread of mobile telephony did not need subsidies.

8. Foreign capital inflows are always good for our economy. Twenty years ago most Indians believed the opposite, that all private foreign capital inflows were bad and somehow designed to impoverish us. In the last two decades the conventional “wisdom” has swung to the opposite extreme. In fact, as both the Asian crisis of 1997-8 and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-9 has amply demonstrated, foreign capital inflows into a developing country can be a mixed blessing. Specifically, for India, the capital inflow surge of 2005-8 posed serious problems of an overly appreciated exchange rate, excess domestic liquidity and an asset price boom. The more thoughtful of our policy-makers, including then Reserve Bank governor Reddy, grasped the need for capital account management in such situations.

9. Private provision of infrastructure can effectively substitute for government. Private public partnerships are the ruling mantra of the day. Since government has failed badly in providing adequate power, roads, ports, water, sanitation and so forth, we must turn to PPPs for our deliverance. Or so runs the new myth. Of course, there is a big and useful part that the private sector can play in building up our infrastructure. But the experience from all over the world suggests that the government must continue to play the major role in this area. In particular, PPPs cannot substitute for effective governance in infrastructure provision. Indeed, there is a growing body of experience which suggests that the governance requirements of PPPs are pretty high, if we are not to fall prey to the rip-offs of crony capitalism.

10. The trader (or middle man) is at the root of many of our economic problems. This is one of our really hoary and hairy myths. Whenever the rate of inflation rises, governments blame rapacious traders and deploy regulations to control their stocking and other activities. The truth is traders are essential to the efficient functioning of an economy. Commerce is the lifeblood of economic activity. Of course, individual traders exploit whatever monopoly power circumstances grant them to maximize their profits. But the problem does not lie with traders. It rests with the circumstances and policies which nurture national or local monopolies and oligopolies. The best antidote to monopolistic exploitation is competition. And that is best nurtured through better connectivity (transport and communication) and reduction of regulations and levies which fragment markets and raise barriers to competition, whether from abroad or at home.


Fiery Geithner

...putting Brady in his place.

Defence is the Last Thing the Dismal Science Needs Right Now

After publishing a parade of articles branding economics as useless for most practical purposes, the Economist finally got a rebuttal out of Robert Lucas. I think he took the hint that the complaint was mainly aimed at Chicago macro rather than macro proper (although the difference between the two can be more or less clear-cut, depending on where you are taught). Lucas said:

One thing we are not going to have, now or ever, is a set of models that forecasts sudden falls in the value of financial assets, like the declines that followed the failure of Lehman Brothers in September. This is nothing new. It has been known for more than 40 years and is one of the main implications of Eugene Fama’s “efficient-market hypothesis” (EMH), which states that the price of a financial asset reflects all relevant, generally available information. If an economist had a formula that could reliably forecast crises a week in advance, say, then that formula would become part of generally available information and prices would fall a week earlier...

The main lesson we should take away from the EMH for policymaking purposes is the futility of trying to deal with crises and recessions by finding central bankers and regulators who can identify and puncture bubbles. If these people exist, we will not be able to afford them.

Now that conclusion sounds pretty dark, even for a dark age. I still struggle to understand the argument though. Prof Lucas's contention is that if there exists a tool that can correctly forecast recession/crisis, then there cannot be a crisis in the first place (the price would have fallen earlier). Hence, proof by contradiction...the fact that Lehman does happen and will happen again, must imply that such a tool cannot exist, ever.

There lies the Achilles heal of the argument. Must Lehman happen again? If there was a tool predicting its calamity, its price would have dropped before Sep 2008. Foreseeing this, Lehman probably would have avoided buying toxic securities. The originators seeing no profit, would have been more careful making subprime loans. And the crisis would never happen. The EMH, conditional on the economists delivering a good set of tool in detecting the eventual crisis, would imply no crisis. And that's what we want!

Whilst private businesses are very good at making money for themselves, they are not too preoccupied with the bigger picture of how their interactions could lead to systemic demise for everyone. After all, that is the job of the economists! To concede that if the market doesn't see it, it is hopeless for economists to work on it, is irresponsible and would indeed push the profession deeper into the dark territory.

Economists' Raison D'etre

At a November visit to the LSE the Queen asked Luis Garicano, an LSE expert on economics and management: “Why did no one see it [the crisis] coming?”

All the Fellows of British Academy who were economists felt compelled to reply. Tim Besley and others thus wrote a letter to the Queen, the essence of which said

Everyone seemed to be doing their own job properly on its own merit. And according to standard measures of success, they were often doing it well. The failure was to see how collectively this added up to a series of interconnected imbalances over which no single authority had jurisdiction. This, combined with the psychology of herding and the mantra of financial and policy gurus, lead to a dangerous recipe. Individual risks may rightly have been viewed as small, but the risk to the system as a whole was vast.

So in summary, Your Majesty, the failure to foresee the timing, extent and severity of the crisis and to head it off, while it had many causes, was principally a failure of the collective imagination of many bright people, both in this country and internationally, to understand the risks to the system as a whole.

Failure of collective imagination! ... lucky for us all the engineers don't have the same problem, or we'll end up with lots of beautiful nuts and bolts that don't quite fit each other.

Samuel Brittan, who's among the FBAs that signed the letter, observed...

It is fruitful to enquire who economists are and what they actually do. This was attempted by the Royal Economic Society in a survey summarised by Ruth Towse and Mark Blaug in an Economic Journal article in March 1990. They came up against the problem that, in contrast to, say, engineers or accountants, “there is no precise way to define the economics profession”. They settled for “someone with at least a second degree in economics” (which thankfully lets me off the hook). Only 8 per cent of economics undergraduates went on to higher degrees but “this has never been allowed to undermine the perception of most academic teachers” that “all their pupils must be trained as if they were going to be professional economists”.

On this definition they estimated that in the UK there were then 3,500 practising economists of whom 2,500 were academics, 600 in private business and 400 in the government. The high salaries paid to some City economists were “atypical”. My own observation is that their repute declined so much after events such as the UK’s forced departure from the exchange rate mechanism in 1992 that some practitioners redefined themselves as “strategists”.



For original articles, check out

Why PPIP flopped

A good and lucid case against using market to help uncovering unknown asset values.

Adverse Selection 101: The Real Reason Why Balance Sheet Detoxification Has Failed by Kenneth Kuttner

When you have problems due to severe market failures, it seems pointless to rely on market for solutions.

Grand Cocktail of Fiscal Stimulus Debate Take 2: The Ricardian Equivalence

For complete beginners, the Ricardian equivalence is a hypothesis that says something along the following line. When the government spends more money without simultaneously raising tax, it must automatically be borrowing from the public (issuing more bonds). That borrowing will eventually have to be paid back to the public, and when that day comes, the government will either need to raise tax or cut spending or both. If the public is smart, they should see this coming and should not react to the initial increase in government spending, because they know that they will have to pay for it in the future. Tax now, or higher tax later (borrower must pay interest rate), the tax bill is the same in present value term. The conclusion is, fiscal stimulus cannot do anything to stimulate consumption.

The details for this is spelled out in Robert Barro's paper "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?", probably in JPE some time in the 70's. I remember reading this some 10 years ago, thinking it's a very neat model but probably doesn't hold in reality. I've also been told that Ricardo himself didn't quite believe it, though I didn't get to read the original reference myself. In any case, the concept's gathering some momentum now, in the fiscal debate round two. Like in the first round, we're not even dealing with the assumptions of the original model (rationality, discount rate, agents' longevity etc), but rather the basic understanding of the model itself. What should we teach our undergrads when we can't have a consensus about anything these days?

Ricardian
Keynesian

Banks' Solvency and Nationalisation

The idea sounds more plausible by the day. Or is there any other way to cure the cancer without replacing the organ? Time for a reading list.

Bookmark this week: Feb 16th 2009

An off-topic...

Bookmark This Week (Feb 10, 2009)

Bookmark This Week (Feb 2, 2009)

Fed Press Release (My highlight)

The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to keep its target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent. The Committee continues to anticipate that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time.

Information received since the Committee met in December suggests that the economy has weakened further. Industrial production, housing starts, and employment have continued to decline steeply, as consumers and businesses have cut back spending. Furthermore, global demand appears to be slowing significantly. Conditions in some financial markets have improved, in part reflecting government efforts to provide liquidity and strengthen financial institutions; nevertheless, credit conditions for households and firms remain extremely tight. The Committee anticipates that a gradual recovery in economic activity will begin later this year, but the downside risks to that outlook are significant.

In light of the declines in the prices of energy and other commodities in recent months and the prospects for considerable economic slack, the Committee expects that inflation pressures will remain subdued in coming quarters. Moreover, the Committee sees some risk that inflation could persist for a time below rates that best foster economic growth and price stability in the longer term.

The Federal Reserve will employ all available tools to promote the resumption of sustainable economic growth and to preserve price stability. The focus of the Committee's policy is to support the functioning of financial markets and stimulate the economy through open market operations and other measures that are likely to keep the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet at a high level. The Federal Reserve continues to purchase large quantities of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities to provide support to the mortgage and housing markets, and it stands ready to expand the quantity of such purchases and the duration of the purchase program as conditions warrant. The Committee also is prepared to purchase longer-term Treasury securities if evolving circumstances indicate that such transactions would be particularly effective in improving conditions in private credit markets. The Federal Reserve will be implementing the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility to facilitate the extension of credit to households and small businesses. The Committee will continue to monitor carefully the size and composition of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet in light of evolving financial market developments and to assess whether expansions of or modifications to lending facilities would serve to further support credit markets and economic activity and help to preserve price stability.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Charles L. Evans; Donald L. Kohn; Dennis P. Lockhart; Kevin M. Warsh; and Janet L. Yellen. Voting against was Jeffrey M. Lacker, who preferred to expand the monetary base at this time by purchasing U.S. Treasury securities rather than through targeted credit programs.

Bookmark This Week (Jan 26, 2009)

Jan 22
Jan 24
Jan 25
Jan 26
Jan 27

Grand Cocktail of Fiscal Stimulus Debate

Pro:
Against:

Footnote:

Bookmark this week (Jan 19, 2009)

Jan 19
Jan 20
Jan 23

Bookmark This Week

Jan 11
Jan 12
Jan 13

What defines an under-developed country?

Answer: Its policy maker?

"So far, the monetary policy of the BOT governor (Tarisa Watanagase) has been in the opposite way of the government's policy. The government wants to stimulate the economy, but the BOT has done the opposite thing," Suchart told a seminar earlier today.

He said he would meet BOT Deputy Governor Atchana Waiquamdee later today and would talke about the monetary policy issue with her.
I am not expecting a top-notch economic genius (who may yet to be born in Thailand) here, but surely we could at least afford someone who have either:
  • Done economics 101, and understand that fiscal policy does not involve interfering with monetary policy, or
  • Heard of time inconsistency and the central bank independence debate, or
  • Read world history, and remember what inevitably happens when inflation is allowed to get out of hand because money supply is dictated by political will
So more education, and we should be sorted? Here comes the real depressing bit...this guy's qualification:
  • B.A. (Hons), (Economics), Thammasat University
  • M.Sc. (Economics), The London School of
    Economics and Political Science, U.K.
  • Ph.D. (Economics), McMaster University, Canada
Maybe it's my fault, and I should go back to brush up my economic education. Not on monetary economics, but on incentives and political economy.

Mohammed El-Erian on Global Economy

The legendary El-Erian speaks at Charlie Rose's programme. I'm buying his book at first opportunity!

Part 1


Part 2


Part 3

MABE: Simulation Game Data, and Other Comments

First of all, I hope you are already aware that tomorrow class (Sat 5th) is postponed to Sunday 13th! Check out the updated schedule here.

Next, regarding the simulation game, links to various data sources can be found at the following:
For those writing Fed reports, you may want to go straight to the following
Those writing ECB reports, please see

Do let me know if there is any other data series which you want, but cannot obtain from the web. I'll try to get them for you if possible.


George Soros on Credit Crisis


George Soros delivered a lecture at the LSE on May 21st, 2008 on his 'reflexivity', credit crisis and others (actually to advertise his book, but still a very interesting talk).


http://www.georgesoros.com/lse-creditcrisis08-podcast